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This paper exploits a quasi-natural experiment to study the effect of social benefits level on 
take-up rates. We find that households who are eligible for double benefits (twins) have much 
higher take-up rate - up to double - as compared to a control group of households. Our 
estimated effect of benefits level is much higher relative to the standard cross section 
estimates. This finding is less exposed to a selection bias that might plague much of the 
previous research on the link between benefits level and take-up. It provides strong empirical 
support for the level of benefits as a key factor in determining take-up rates. 
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Introduction 
 
Not all the poor who are eligible for welfare benefits do actually collect them. Low 
take-up rates of social benefits should be a concern for policy makers because it 
reduces the chances of achieving the policy goal. There is no consensus built 
regarding the three competing explanations for low take-up rates: administrative, 
stigma and information costs. In contrast, the strong positive effect of benefits level 
on take-up rates is one of the most solid findings in the literature on means-tested 
programs.
4 This empirical relation found across social programs and across countries. 
 
Yet, this finding might suffer the risk of a selection bias that even its direction is a 
priory unclear. This is because participation costs are likely to be indirectly related to 
the level of benefits in means-tested programs. For example, households who are 
eligible for lower benefits because of higher earnings skills may face a lower 
information cost in case these skills are also an important input in collecting and 
processing information. As a result, these skills that may not be observable are 
responsible for both lower benefits and lower participation costs. 
 
The selection bias may also work in the opposite direction due to the potential 
negative relations between participation costs and social benefits level through other 
channels. For example, those who are better educated but still eligible for small 
benefits may face a high stigma cost. Again, the level of benefits and participation 
cost are jointly determined by a third variable which may not be observable.
5 
 
The goal of this paper is to study the effect of benefits level on take-up rates of social 
benefits as embodied in water consumption bills in the City of Jerusalem (Israel) 
                                                 
4 This finding repeats itself in many works. For example, Blank and Card (1991) found that higher 
benefit replacement rates are correlated with higher take-up rates. Also, Ashenfelter (1983), Blank and 
Ruggles (1996), Anderson and Meyer (1997), McGarry (1996), Daponte et al (1999) and Bitler et al 
(2003) all share that positive correlation. For a more comprehensive survey of this literature see Currie 
(2004) and Hernanz et al. (2004). 
5 A selection bias may arise also because those who are eligible for small amount of benefits might be 
different from those who are entitled to large benefits. For instance, those who barely meet the program 
criteria and as result eligible for small benefits are likely to have higher income or wealth as compared 
to those who are eligible for large benefits. Differences in benefits level imply also differences in 
marginal utility that may affect the decision to collect social benefits. This selection problem may 
introduce estimation bias even after controlling for households characteristics to the extent that 
program criteria differ from those characteristics that are observable to econometricians.   4
using a quasi-natural experiment strategy. The unique disaggregated data set on water 
consumers we have allows us to accurately define take-up. Take-up rate in the general 
population of Jerusalem is around 65 percent which is well within the range found in 
welfare programs in OECD countries (Hernanz et al, 2004). 
 
To estimate that effect we use an exogenous event, a birth of twins to a four-member 
household which is uncontaminated by the influence of heterogeneity in participation 
costs. In our context the occurrence of a twins-birth is likely to be exogenous because 
better access to assisted reproductive technologies is not relevant as much as it is for 
the first or second birth.
6 
 
The water pricing structure in Israel consists of three increasing blocks tariffs (IBT). 
This pricing structure has an additional feature. Households larger than four persons 
are entitled to an additional 36 cubic meters per person per year at a low rate. The 
monetary value of that additional quantity of water could be up to 13 percent of 
annual water expenditures. This social benefit is non-automatic and a household must 
complete a very simple form (half a page) to take-up that social benefit. Every 
household, regardless of its income or wealth, is entitled to this social benefit. 
 
We study the take-up patterns of two groups of households following a household 
expansion. The first group consists of four-member households that had expanded by 
one member (singleton). The second group is composed of households of four 
members that expanded to six members (twins). For robustness check we also 
followed the behavioral response of households who had twins but were three 
members before the household expansion. 
 
We test whether households who had twins reacts differently in terms of taking-up 
their social benefits as compared to households who had singleton. The first group is 
entitled to double benefits according to the rules of the program while facing the same 
(direct) administrative and stigma costs. Due to the universality of the benefit, it is 
plausible to assume, that the stigma cost does not play an important role in our 
context. 
                                                 
6 Note that a family of two adults and three children is very common in Israel (total fertility rate in 
Israel is close to three).   5
 
A standard cost-benefits model suggests that eligible households would apply if the 
expected benefits are higher than the cost. The straightforward implication is that for a 
given cost of participation a positive relation exists between the level of benefits and 
take-up rates of social benefits. The exogenous event we employ here assures that 
participation costs do not vary with benefits level. 
 
Twins-based studies add a valuable contribution to social sciences by providing us 
with better understanding of the causal relationship between various important 
variables such as earnings and schoolings (Ashenfelter and Kruger, 1994), the effect 
of fertility on labor supply (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980b) and the link between 
quality and quantity of children (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980a). Our paper is the 
first to use a twins event to study take-up rates of social benefits.  
 
In the next section we describe the structure of social benefits in water consumption 
and the benefit calculation. In Section 2 a simple model of take-up is presented to 
guide our discussion regarding the potential risk of selection bias. Section 3 describes 
the definition of take-up and Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 presents the 
estimation methodology, results and robustness analysis and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. A simple model of take-up 
 
In this Section we sketch a very simple model to guide our discussion on the potential 
selection bias in estimating the effect of benefits level on take-up of social benefits. 
This model also provides us with theoretical prediction regarding that relation under 
various assumptions. 
 
Suppose a household drives utility from monetary income only: 
 
(1) ), Y ( U U1 =  
 
where U1 is the utility level in absence of welfare benefits, Y is income from all 
sources (wage and non-wage income) and U follows the standard assumptions   6
(monotonic and quasi-concave). If a household participates in a welfare program then 
the utility, U2 is: 
 
(2) ), B Y ( U U2 φ − + =  
 
where B represents the level of welfare benefits and φ stands for participation costs.
7 
This formulation assumes that the costs of collecting welfare benefits are monetary 
costs only. Later we refer to the case of a non-monetary cost such as stigma that may 
affect utility differently. The level of benefits is determined by a commonly used 
equation (a formula that is used in many welfare programs throughout the world): 
 
(3)  rN twH G B − − =  , 
 
where G is a the level of benefits in case of zero income, w is the wage rate, H is the 
number of hours of work, N is non-wage income and r is the tax on non-wage income. 
G, t and r are the same for all households but w, H and N may vary across households. 
To keep the discussion simple, all six variables (G, t, r, w, H and N) are assumed to be 
exogenous but may affect the cost of participation in a particular way. It is more 
plausible to assume that H is an endogenous variable. Assuming that would reinforce 
the selection bias problem. According to Equation (3), the level of benefits is related 
to total income which is a key feature of means-tested programs. 
 
Suppose that the costs of participation in a welfare program have both a fixed 
component and a variable component that varies with benefits level: 
 
(4) ) B ( 1 0 φ + φ = φ , 
 
A household will decide to participate in the program as long as benefits are greater 
than costs regardless of the level of income. That result is particular to the way the 
costs affect utility. A household is likely to participate the greater the benefits level is 
                                                 
7  This formulation of U2 is similar to the fixed stigma costs case in Moffitt (1983) but here we allow 
for both fixed and variable stigma costs. Unlike Moffitt (1983), our framework shows that the key 
assumption regarding the connection between benefits level and take-up rates is the way participation 
costs affects utility. That link is not sensitive to whether the participation cost is fixed or not.   7
in case where  0 φ >0 and  1 φ =0, which is the most simple case. Obviously, a household 
would not participate regardless of benefits level if 0 φ is high enough (more than G) or 
if G is low enough. Thus, a positive correlation between take-up rates and benefits 
level is consistent with 0 φ < G. 
 
The results are qualitatively the same also in the more general case where 
participation costs varies with the level of benefits in additional to a fixed cost 
component. A household is expected to apply for benefits the higher the level of 
benefits is. This result is not sensitive to whether the participation costs are positively 
or negatively related to the level of benefits. Clearly, the participation in the program 
is worthwhile even at lower levels of benefits if the participation cost is negatively 
related to benefits level (as compared to the case of positive relation between benefits 
level and a participation cost). 
 
This simple framework shows that positive relations between take-up and benefits 
level could be consistent with any type of participation costs (administrative, 
information or stigma) as long as this cost is low enough. Therefore the empirical 
finding mentioned above could not be used as supporting evidence for either the 
importance of administration, information or stigma costs. 
 
Let us focus now on the relation between benefits level and participation costs. 
Suppose that those who have higher value of time (high w) are also better in 
collecting and processing information. It implies that those who have lower levels of 
benefits (high w implies lower B given Equation (3)) are also likely to face lower 
participation costs. This has a direct econometric implication: estimating the effect of 
benefits level is biased unless the heterogeneity in costs is controlled for. 
 
This is a suitable framework when administrative and information costs are the main 
costs of participation. These two types of costs are likely to have monetary 
implication both directly and indirectly through the value of time spent on applying, 
searching and processing information. However, if the main participation costs are 
associated with stigma then it makes more sense to model the decision to take up   8
social benefits in a slightly different way. Rewrite Equation (2) with a minor but 
important change: 
 
(5) , ) B Y ( U U2 φ − + =  
 
Assume that all other equations are the same. A household decide to participate if U2-
U1>φ.
8 Under this structure, take-up rates are again related positively to the level of 
benefits assuming a fixed stigma cost. But here the decision to participate depends on 
the level of income given the assumed shape of utility function. For a given level of 
benefits and costs, those who have higher income are less likely to apply for welfare 
benefits.
9 Thus, unlike the previous setting one has to control also for income 
differences to get unbiased effect of benefits level.  
 
Suppose that those who have higher income also have higher stigma costs involved in 
collecting welfare benefit.
10 In this case the cost of participation is related positively 
to the level of benefits because those who have higher income are entitled to lower 
benefits. This framework also predicts a positive connection between take-up rates 
and benefits level as long as ) B ( 1 φ is strictly concave. In contrast, the effect of benefits 
level on take-up is non-linear if ) B ( 1 φ is not strictly concave. For example if  ) B ( 1 φ is 
linear in B then those who are eligible for both low and high B would not apply for 
welfare benefits while those who are entitled to intermediate levels of benefits would 
decide to take up their benefits. 
 
This section shows that a selection bias is likely to be a problem in estimating the 
effect of benefits level on take-up rates because of unobservable heterogeneity in 
participation costs. The direction of the bias depends on the underlining assumptions 
regarding the relationship between income, participation costs and benefits level. 
 
                                                 
8This formulation of U2 is similar to the fixed stigma costs case in Moffitt (1983) but again our is 
flexible to allow for both fixed and variable stigma costs. We show here that the type of relations 
between participation cost and benefits level (rather than fixed or variable) has an important 
implication for the predicted link between benefits level and take-up.  
9  Household may differ in their income but still have the same level of benefits because different tax 
rates on different sources of income. 
10 Several studies show that take-up rates are negatively correlated with schooling and that finding 
might reflect higher stigma cost for better educated (and high Y) people.   9
As it will be evident clearly later our estimator is less exposed to this type of bias. Our 
experiment is similar to a rise in G which is less likely to interact with the cost of 
participation. 
 
3. Social benefit in water consumption 
 
The social benefit that is the focus of this paper is provided to all households in Israel 
in terms of reduced price for one of the most basic goods – water. In this regard it is 
close to in-kind transfer and is similar in nature to food stamps. The pricing structure 
of water in Israel consists of three increasing block tariffs (IBT).
11  
 
In 2002, the price in the first block, applying to the first 96 cubic meters (hereinafter: 
m
3), was $1.2/m
3 including a sewage surcharge. The price in the second block, for 
additional consumption up to 84 cubic meters, was $1.5/m




This pricing structure has an additional feature. Households larger than four persons 
are entitled to an additional 36m
3 per year at a low rate for each member above four.
12 
This particular feature has been an integral part of IBT structure for more than 30 
years, and is both universal and non-automatic. To receive this social benefit a 
household must report on household size: half a page requesting only the names and 
ID numbers of all household members.  
 
A household must report to the water utility provider every time a new member joins 
the household in order to get the supplementary quantity of water at a low price. This 
benefit may continue for years until a member leaves the household. According to the 
law, the benefit starts on the reporting date onward (no retroactive incidence). The 
social benefit takes effect right after reporting (i.e., the next billing period). There is 
no uncertainty regarding the outcome of the application process and in practice no 
rejections occurs.      
                                                 
11 Israel was one of the pioneers in using IBT Pricing structure. In the past twenty years it has seen a 
global trend toward the use of IBT (OECD 1999). 
12     Households with irrigated lawns are allowed an additional 0.6m
3 per square meter per year, up to 
300m
3, at a low price (excluding sewage surcharge).   10
 
3.1 Benefit calculation 
 
We define social benefit in this paper as the difference between the current (virtual) 
water bill in the case of reporting on household size and virtual (current) water bill in 
the case of non-reporting. Unlike food stamps, the social benefit here depends on the 
level of (water) consumption. For example, the social benefit could even be zero if 
water consumption is low enough (Equation 1). 
 
As can be seen in Equation (1), the calculated benefit depends non-linearly on the 
level of water consumption. This equation applies for a household larger than four 
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Where SB denotes the yearly social benefit, C denotes the actual water consumption, 
N denotes the true number of persons above four and Pi denotes the marginal price of 
water at block i. X is defined as the difference between the actual water consumption 
and 36 multiply by N. Recall that every household is entitled to 96m
3 of water at a 
low rate and an additional 84m
3 at an intermediate rate. 
 
The maximum yearly social benefit for an additional household member equals the 
difference between the highest and lowest price multiplied by the supplementary 
quantity (Figure 1). The maximum present value of social benefit per person is 
approximately $315. For a given price, the level of benefits is exactly double for a 
household of four who expanded by two (twins). To obtain the maximum present 
value of social benefits for a household, that amount should be multiplied by the 
number of household members above four for each year.   11
 
Figure 1: Yearly social benefit for the fifth and sixth members











4. The definition of take-up 
 
There are two alternative ways to define take-up in this paper. One way is to define 
take-up based on the reporting status of households. An alternative definition of take-
up could be based on the presence of a positive social benefit in addition to reporting 
status. We employ only the first definition for reasons that are discussed below. 
 
According to the first definition, the eligible population is divided into participants 
and non-participants. Participants are those households that have reported to 
“Hagihon” the same number of individuals as appears in the official files in the 
Ministry of the Interior. We assume here that the size of a household in the official 
files is also the actual size. These data files are used by the Israeli government for 
many purposes such as determining child allowance eligibility, elections, and drafting 
the relevant population into the army. Our database does not contain the household 
age structure and reporting date. Therefore, we do not know the length of 
participation. 
 
The definition of take-up that we use, which is based on the household’s reporting 
status, may include households that have ex-post zero social benefit due to a low level   12
of water consumption in the current year and seemingly has no incentive to report. 
The weakness of using the first definition is quantitatively limited. Most households 
in our working data set are not in the lowest price category. Most of five-member 
households is either at the intermediate or highest marginal price level (Table 3). 
  
Alternatively, we could have defined take-up in the following way: a reporting 
household that is also entitled to a positive social benefit is defined as a participant. 
Those households that are entitled to a positive social benefit and yet do not report 
would have been defined as non-participants. 
 
However, a rational household should decide to report based on the expected present 
value of social benefits that could be different from the ex-post calculation of social 
benefit in the current year. Recall that the calculated social benefit depends on actual 
water consumption, which is uncertain. The alternative definition would overlook 
households who had positive benefits in the past (and may have in the future) but 
have zero benefits at the current year. 
 
A definition that is based on the calculated social benefit may be exposed to an 
endogeneity problem. The dependent variable in this case – entitlement to a positive 
social benefit – is influenced by the household level of water consumption. Actual 
water consumption is clearly an endogenous variable and is associated with household 
characteristics. For example, poor households tend to have disproportional zero social 
benefits because of low level of water consumption while rich households more likely 
to have a positive social benefit due to their high consumption level. Therefore, using 
take-up as a dependent variable based on this definition would introduce an 
endogeneity problem when household wealth indicators are used as explanatory 
variables. 
 
The alternative definition may be exposed to an additional source of endogeneity. The 
endogeneity results from the negative relationship between reporting status and water 
price. Those households who do not report on their size face higher price compared to 
households who do report, holding everything else constant. The actual level of water 
consumption of households who do report may be higher. The calculated benefits for 
reporting households are biased to the extent that the elasticity of water consumption   13
is negative (Dahan and Nisan, 2007). Thus, it generates a spurious positive correlation 




The original data set we have covers all households in Jerusalem for the years 1999-
2002.
13 Our data set comes from three main sources: “Hagihon,” the only water utility 
in Jerusalem; the Municipality of Jerusalem; and the Israel Ministry of the Interior. 
Most of the data originate with the Municipality of Jerusalem and were merged with 
household water consumption data from “Hagihon” and household size at the end of 
each year from the Ministry of the Interior. 
 
In the merged data set we have information on household size from two different 
sources: household size as reported to “Hagihon” and household size as documented 
in the Ministry of the Interior. This allows us to identify those households that are 
entitled to the social benefit but do not collect it. Thus, the use of these two data 
sources enables us to define eligibility and take-up in a relatively precise way. 
 
As discussed previously, the eligible population is composed of households larger 
than four persons. The main focus is to analyze take-up rate patterns following a 
family expansion of those households that are four persons or larger. As a result, all 
households of four persons or less were excluded.   
 
Our main working population consists of households that had expanded between 1999 
and 2002 according to the official files (i.e., the Ministry of Interior). We constructed 
three different pools (A, B and C) that differ in time distance between household 
expansion and the timing we examine the reporting status.  
 
The first pool is composed of three panels – 1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 – 
where in the first pool we have information on the same household for two 
                                                 
13 We excluded observations for several reasons (commercial consumers, shared meters consumers, 
households larger than twelve individuals, households metered during part of the year and 
identification mismatch at different sources).   14
consecutive years.
14 This allows us to identify those households that had expanded 
during the second year and their reporting status at the end of the same year, a half 
year after the expansion on average. For the sake of conciseness, throughout the paper 
we use one year, two years and three years instead of a half year, a year and a half and 
two years and half, respectively.  
 
The second pool includes two panels – 1999-2001 and 2000-2002. We follow the 
same household for three consecutive years. This covers those households that had 
expanded during the second year together with their reporting status at the end of the 
third year, a year and half after the expansion on average. The third pool, which is in 
fact a panel, is composed of households with information for four consecutive years 
(1999-2002). This covers those households that had expanded during the second year 
together with their reporting status at the end of the fourth year, two years and half 
after the expansion on average. In both pools B and C those households that were 
expanded more than once were excluded because those households face a different 
administrative cost and are entitled to double or even triple social benefits.  
 
In all three pools, we focus on three groups of households. The first group of 
households is those who were four and expanded by two. In pool A the first group 
(hereinafter: the treated group) is composed of 79 households (Table 1). The second 
group of pool A consists of 2,656 four-member households that expanded by one 
member only. These households are our main control group. We also use households 
that expanded by two but were three members before the expansion as an additional 
treated group. In pool A this third group covers 97 households. 
  
Table 2 presents take-up rates using the definition outlined above for various time 
lags between the date of expansion and timing of reporting status. The take-up rate 
among households of four members that become five is around 41 percent two years 
after the expansion. This is much lower compared to the take-up rate among 
households of four members that become six which is 66 percent.
15 The gap in take-
                                                 
14 The data available to us consists of households who stay in the same apartment for the entire period 
in each panel. 
15 This average masks a huge difference between the two panels included in pool B. The take up rate in 
the first panel (1999-2001) is 82 percent while it is only 50 percent in the second panel (2000-2002). 
We do not have a good explanation for that drop in take-up rate.   15
up rates between the treated and control group is even higher in the third panel (1999-
2002), 44 percentage points. Note that the take-up rates of household who expanded 
to five but were three members before the expansion is just slightly higher than that of 
household who expanded to five but were four members before the expansion. 
 
Time distance between the date of expansion and reporting status matters as is evident 
in Table 2. The take-up rate after two years is almost twice as much as the rate after 
one year (which is in fact six months on average). Clearly, it takes some time to 
collect the social benefit associated with reporting. The take-up after three years is 
just slightly higher compared to two years. For example, the take-up rate among 
households of four members that become five 20 percent after one year, 41 percent 
after two years and 45 percent three years after the expansion. Notice that these take-
up rates are different from the take-up rates of the same household for various time 
distances. A similar picture arises following take-up rates patterns of the same 






In order to examine the effect of social benefits level on take-up we distinguish 
between two separate groups of households. These two groups are identical in the 
following sense: they both expanded at the beginning of the respective period. The 
first type is a four-member household that expanded by one member and therefore is 
entitled to an additional 36m
3 of water at a low rate. The second type is a four-
member household that expanded by two members (twins) at the beginning of the 
respective period. Those households are eligible for an additional 72m
3 of water at a 
low rate according to the rules of the program. 
 
For a given price, the treated group is entitled to double benefits compared to the 
control group but face the same direct administrative cost. The social benefit in water 
consumption is associated with a low administrative cost. To obtain the 
supplementary quantity of water at a low price, a household must fill out a very   16
simple form: half a page requesting only the names and ID numbers of all household 
members, and the attached birth certificate of the newborn (see Appendix 1). A 
household may declare on one, two or even more additional members on the same 
form. In Israel, every family automatically receives a birth certificate immediately 
after a baby is born. The form may be sent by regular mail (cost of a stamp) or via fax 
(cost of a phone call).  
 
Reporting the number of household members does not require sharing information 
regarding the household’s economic conditions such as income, wealth or working 
status with the water utility officials, information that may be associated with 
psychological or social costs as in the case of income maintenance programs. This 
additional quantity is given to every household above four regardless of its income. 
Thus, both the treated and control groups face the same negligible stigma cost due to 
the universality of that social benefit. 
 
Potentially, the treatment effect (higher social benefits) may be influenced by 
differences in household characteristics. In general, the twins-event may not be 
exogenous and might be related to household characteristics. For example, families 
with high income may have better access to infertility treatment and therefore may be 
characterized by a higher probability of having twins. This might be true for the first 
birth while here the twins-event is conditional on that the household has already four 
members. 
 
 Table 5a presents household characteristics for both groups. It shows that in general 
the treated and control groups share similar characteristics and that should affect our 
confidence regarding the random assignment of these two groups. The differences in 
characteristics are not statistically significant except for one case (out of three) where 
the share of Orthodox Jews households who had a twins-birth is significantly higher. 
Therefore, there is less risk of systematic differences in participation costs between 
the treated and control groups due to differences in household characteristics. 
 
For a robustness test we use households of three members that had expanded by two 
(twins) as an alternative control group. This group of households is entitled to the 
same benefits level as a household of four members who expanded by one member   17
and also face the same administrative cost. By using an alternative control group we 
are able to examine whether the twins event in itself (not related to benefits level) 
plays a role in shaping take-up rates. 
 
As expected, when comparing between households of three and four members there 
are more cases of significant differences (Table 5b). This reflects the fact that 
household size before the expansion in one group is lower and it may be correlated 
with other household characteristics. For example, the share of Orthodox Jews 
households who had a twins birth is significantly higher among four-member 
households, and it reflects the tendency of this population group to have more 
children. Yet, there are more cases where the differences are not significant. In 
particular, in two cases (out of three) there is no significant difference between these 
two groups in apartment size which is a key wealth indicator. 
 
6.2 The estimated models 
We estimate two alternative models: the first model does not control for any 
household characteristics while the other model addresses a potential effect of the 
differences in household characteristics and a year effect.  
 
First model: 
(2)   i i i bD a y ε + + = , 
 
and second model: 
(3)  i j j i i i t D y ε + δ + γ + β + α = x  , 
 
where, yi is a dummy variable that is equal to one for a household that had reported 
and zero otherwise. xi denotes a vector of household characteristics in the respective 
period and Di represents a dummy variable for the treatment effect. Di is a binary 
variable that equals 1 for a treated household and zero for a control household. We 
also control for a year effect, tj where there are two separate year effects in the case of 
three panels, one year effect in the case of two panels and no year effect in the case of 
three years panel. 
   18
The vector x includes an array of household characteristics, as documented before the 
expansion, that may affect reporting behavior. There are three types of variables: 
wealth indicators (apartment size, garden size and poverty indicator
16), social network 
indicators (Orthodox Jews and Arabs), language barrier (Arabs) and the virtual 
marginal price of water faced by a household which represents an additional 
dimension of the level of social benefits. 
 
The net effect of wealth on take-up is uncertain. A simple cost-benefit model of 
collecting social benefits would predict that take-up rates should be falling as wealth 
rises due to lower marginal utility. This is true under certain formulation as shown in 
Section 2. But on the other hand, wealth may affect take-up rates indirectly (through 
the connection between education and wealth) because we do not control for 
education in our regressions. A wealthier household may incur a lower cost of 
collecting and processing information given the positive relations between wealth and 
education. 
 
According to the recent literature, we hypothesize that a household that belongs to a 
social network is more likely to be informed and as a result would have higher 
probability of reporting (Bertrand et al, 2000).
17 In Jerusalem there are two large 
distinct ethnic groups that may be classified as social networks: Orthodox Jews and 
Arabs. An Orthodox Jewish household is defined as such if it is located in an 
Orthodox neighborhood as classified in the Jerusalem master plan. Similarly, a 
household is defined as Arab if it lives in an Arab neighborhood as classified in the 
Jerusalem master plan. Each one of these two groups maintains close personal 
relations internally and has little social connection with the rest of the population. In 
fact, the Arab population has almost no social connection with the Jewish population.  
 
In addition, an Arab household may face a language barrier. Although the criteria for 
an additional quantity of water at a low rate are outlined both in Hebrew and Arabic 
on the back page of every water bill, the application form is available in Hebrew only. 
Part of the Arabs population in East Jerusalem who affiliate themselves with the 
                                                 
16 In this paper, a household is considered below the poverty line if it is entitled to a municipal tax 
deduction. This tax deduction is means-tested and is indirectly related to the formal poverty line in 
Israel. 
17  See also Duflo and Saez 2003, Borjas and Hilton 1996.   19
Palestinian Authority tend to minimize the frequency of contacts with Israeli official 
authorities. Therefore, they may be less exposed to information regarding their 
entitlement to social benefits. The Arab population may face lower information costs 
due to the social network but at the same time incurs higher information costs due to 
language barrier. Thus, the net effect must be examined empirically. 
 
As noted before, the treated group is entitled to a double quantity of water at a low 
rate following the current expansion by two members. Those households who gave 
birth to twins at the beginning of the period are expected to have higher take-up rates 
compared to the control group for a given application cost.  
 
Note that the actual level of social benefits may differ also depending on the actual 
level of water consumption that determines the marginal price paid by a household. 
We control for the virtual marginal price which is a proxy to that dimension of 
benefits level. A marginal virtual price is defined as the marginal price that would 
have been faced by a household given its actual water consumption in the event of no 
reporting on household size. 
 
In general, households that reported on the current expansion face a lower (actual) 
marginal price as compared to households that did not report. This may affect their 
actual water consumption to the extent that price elasticity of water demand is 
negative. The virtual price might be higher for a reporting household and as a result 
the coefficient might be biased downward. 
 
6.3 Results 
We run an OLS regression with and without control variables for household 
characteristics. The outcomes of interest in our case are limited dependent variables. 
However, as noted in Angrist (2001), the problem of causal inference for these 
variables is not fundamentally different from continuous outcomes. If there are no 
covariates or the covariates are sparse and discrete, linear models are no less 
appropriate than other types of dependent variables. The OLS coefficients of dummy 
variables have a natural interpretation as the average change in take-up rates.
18  
                                                 
18 Table 7 presents Logit regressions and the general picture is the same.    20
 
To estimate the effect of benefits level as captured by our treatment dummy variable 
we use three different pools, according to the time gap between the year of household 
expansion and the date of reporting on that expansion. In the first pool the dependent 
variable is defined based on the reporting status of a household a year after the 
expansion. The second and third pools are based on reporting status two and three 
years after the household expansion, respectively.  
 
Table 6 reports the coefficients and t statistics for the two estimated models. In a 
regression without any control variable, the take-up rates of those households of four 
members who expanded by twins are higher but the significance is borderline when 
take-up is examined at the end of expansion year. However, the coefficient of the 
treated group is around 25 percentage points higher and very significant when the 
reporting status is detected at the end of the second year after the expansion (in a 
regression without any control variable). The magnitude of the treatment effect is 
even much higher when the reporting status is checked at the end of the third year 
since the household expansion. 
 
As can be seen from Table 6, the dummy variable for households who had twins but 
were three members before that household expansion is not significantly different 
from zero in all cases. It implies that their behavioral response is similar to those 
households of four-members who had expanded to five. 
 
These two groups of households are entitled to the same benefits level and a direct 
administrative cost and they indeed react in similar way. This finding suggest that the 
driving force behind our main result regarding the positive connection between 
benefits level and take-up rates are not related to the twins event in itself but rather to 
the real differences in benefits level across households. 
 
We saw earlier that in some cases the treated and control groups are not completely 
identical in all their characteristics. In the second estimated model we control for both 
household characteristics and a year effect. The year effect turns out to be 
insignificant in all cases. The results appear in Table 6 show that the effect of 
treatment is only slightly lower, after controlling for various explanatory variables and   21
a year effect. The magnitude of the treatment effect is closer to the first estimated 
model regardless of when the reporting status is examined.  
 
The coefficients estimated in both models imply a quantitatively very large effect. 
The estimated take-up rate of the treated group is at least 42 percent higher as 
compared to the control group. This supports the idea that benefits level play a key 
role in shaping take-up rates. 
 
As discussed above, the Arab household dummy variable reflects two conflicting 
forces in terms of information costs. The negative sign of this coefficient and its 
magnitude is consistent with the hypothesis that language barrier has much more 
influence than social network. The Arab coefficient implies close to 20 percentage 
points lower take-up rate for an Arab household when reporting status is detected at 
the end of the third or fourth year since household expansion. 
 
The Orthodox Jewish dummy variable represents a lower information cost due to 
better social network. As expected, the coefficient is positive and it is highly 
significant.   
 
As anticipated, the level of social benefits positively affects take-up rates as implied 
by the virtual price coefficient. A lower virtual price implies also lower social benefit 
level that means less incentive (or no incentive) for a household to report on 
household size. In general, the coefficient of virtual price A (the price lowest) is 
significantly negative compared to the intermediate price. This result is in line with 
our main finding which attributes important role for benefits level in determining 
take-up rates. 
 
In general, all wealth indicators (apartment size by quintiles, garden size and poverty 
indicator) are insignificant. This finding is consistent with either the theoretical 
framework presented in Section 2 where participation costs are monetary only or with 
the notion that lower marginal utility associated with higher wealth level is canceled 
out by the effect of lower information costs related to higher level of education and 
wealth. 
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To get an order of magnitude of the selection bias that might be associated with 
simple cross-section regression, we run a similar specification to the one in Table 6 
but where all households in our data set that consist of either five or six members.
19 
Those households who have six members are eligible for higher benefits level as 
compared to five-member households and are expected to have higher take-up rate. 
Seemingly, the difference in take-up rate should be the same as the gap between our 
treated and control groups.  
 
Table 8 shows that the estimated effect of benefits level on take-up rate is much 
smaller in that cross-section regression as compared to our estimates based on quasi-
natural experiment. The coefficient of a six-member household is 4.6 percentage 
points whereas in the twins-event the estimate is almost 8 times higher when the 
reporting status is detected after three years.
20 This exercise highlights the potential 
risk of a selection bias. 
 
In our context, part of the selection bias comes from the positive relation between 
participation costs and benefits level embodied in the program. A household of six 
members is entitled to higher benefits but also face higher administrative costs 
because a household has to apply for benefits following each household expansion 
which is twice as much for a household of six members. Thus, the lower estimate of 
benefits level on take-up partially may reflect the burden of higher costs on household 





This paper presents the estimated effect of benefits level on take-up patterns of social 
benefits. The quasi-natural experiment that we employ generates estimates that are 
much less exposed to a selection bias. In addition, the two reliable sources we have on 
                                                 
19  For example, Currie (2000) uses the family size as a proxy for benefits level in cross-section 
regression. 
20  A six-member household is defined in this exercise as a participant if and only if that household had 
reported on both the fifth and sixth members. According to this definition a six-member household is 
entitled to double benefits as compared to a five-member household.    23
eligibility and take-up allow us to estimate the effect of benefits level based on a 
precise definition of take-up. 
 
We show that households who are entitled to higher benefits have substantially higher 
take-up rate compared to a control group of households. Households who expanded 
by two members and as a result are eligible for double benefits have higher take-up 
rates as compared to a control group of households (households that expanded by one 
member).  
 
The difference in terms of take-up rates is both highly significant and quantitative 
very large when the reporting status is checked at the end of the second or third year. 
The take-up rate of our treated group is twice of that of the control when the reporting 
status is detected at the end of the third year, two years and half after the expansion on 
average. Under that time table, households of four members who had twins have both 
double benefits and double take-up rate as compared to our control group. 
 
In contrast, exploiting the cross section variation in household characteristics as done 
in previous research generates a much lower estimated effect of benefits level on take-
up rates. It implies that the estimated effect of benefits level is subject to a 
quantitatively very large selection bias using the more standard estimation strategy.  
 
We found also that variables that are directly associated with information costs such 
as social network indicators (Orthodox Jews and Arabs) and language barrier (Arabs) 
have significant influence on take-up rates. In contrast, we do not trace significant 
effect of wealth indicators such as apartment size on take-up rates. 
 
The main conclusion to be drawn from this paper is that the benefits level plays a 
major role in the decision to participate in a program. This finding may be consistent 
with all three explanations put forward in the literature: information, administrative 
and stigma costs (although stigma costs should not have a significant effect in our 
context). A rational household should invest more time collecting information as 
benefits get higher. Also, for a given administrative cost a household is more likely to 
participate when benefits level is higher. 
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In designing a means-tested program a policy maker should consider setting welfare 
benefits at even higher level than what is needed by the targeted population account 
for all types of participation costs. Otherwise, part of the targeted population would 
choose not to participate and take-up rate is expected to be low when participation 
costs are high enough. Determining the level of benefits in a targeted program 
becomes even more complicated to the extent that participation costs are 
heterogeneous across the needy households.   25
 
Table 1: The data by type of household (number of households) 
  Total  4 who turn 5  4 who turn 6  3 who turn 5 
Pool A (1 year)  2,832  2,656  79  97 
1999-2000 908  853  25  30 
2000-2001 955  893  28  34 
2001-2002 969  910  26  33 
        
Pool B (2 years)  1,469  1,377  44  48 
1999-2001 723  678  22  23 
2000-2002 746  699  22  25 
        
Pool C (3 years) 
(1999-2002) 
457 421  18  18 
 
   26
 
Table 2: Take-up rates for different time horizon 
Type of household  Sample 
4 who turn 5  4 who turn 6  3 who turn 5 
Pool A (1 year)  0.20  0.29  0.23 
1999-2000  0.21 0.32 0.27 
2000-2001  0.22 0.21 0.21 
2001-2002  0.18 0.35 0.21 
    
Pool B (2 years)  0.41  0.66  0.50 
1999-2001  0.42 0.82 0.49 
2000-2002  0.41 0.50 0.52 
    
Pool C (3 years) 
(1999-2002) 
0.45 0.89 0.50 
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Table 3: Households distribution by actual price as documented before the 
expansion 
Type of household  Actual price 
4 who turn 5  4 who turn 6  3 who turn 5 
Pool A (1 year)  2656  100%  79  100%  97  100% 
Low  92   3.5%  1   1.3%  7   7.2% 
Intermediate   1033   38.9%  24   30.4%  48   49.5% 
High  1531   57.6%  54   68.4%  42   43.3% 
Pool B (2 years)  1377  100%  44  100%  48  100% 
Low  52   3. 8%  1   2.3%  2   4.2% 
Intermediate   482   35.0%  14   31.8%  24   50. 0% 
High  843   61.2%  29   65.9%  22   45.8% 
Pool C (3 years)  421 100%  18  100%  18  100% 
Low  12   2.9%  0   0.0%  0   0.0% 
Intermediate   120   28.5%  6   33.3%  10   55.6% 
High  289   68.7%  12   66.7%  8   44.4% 
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Table 4: Take-up rates for different time distances for the same household 
 
Time Length since 
eligibility date 
4 that become 5 
(Control Group)
4 that become 6  
(Treated Group) 
3 that become 5 
(Control group) 
 
One  year  16% 28%  28% 
 
Two years  37% 83%  44% 
 
Three years  45% 89%  50% 
No. of observations  421  18  18 
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Table 5a: Descriptive statistics - a comparison of treated and control groups 
 














Obs  60 79  79 79 
Mean 74.70  0.38  0.04  199.49 
4 turn 6 
Std  22.06 0.49  0.19 79.37 
Obs  1,894 2,656  2,656 2,656 
Mean 73.23  0.36  0.06  181.96 
4 turn 5 
Std  21.95 0.48  0.23 91.87 
 Means' 
Difference 1.47  0.02  -0.02 17.53 
One year 
 T  statistic  0.51  0.28  -0.84  1.93 
Obs  35 44  44 44 
Mean 75.97  0.43  0.05  193.00 
4 turn 6 
Std 21.17  0.5  0.21  76.11 
Obs  1,083 1,377  1,377 1,377 
Mean 74.60  0.35  0.06  188.12 
4 turn 5 
Std  22.74 0.48  0.23 94.85 
 Means' 
Difference 1.37  0.08  -0.01  4.88 
Two 
Years 
 T  statistic  0.38  1.11  -0.28  0.42 
Obs  17 18  18 18 
Mean 78.82  0.50  0  189.55 
4 turn 6 
Std 25.50  0.51  0  58.97 
Obs  350 421  421 421 
Mean 77.14  0.21  0.08  199.47 
4 turn 5 
Std  23.84 0.41  0.27 97.44 
 Means' 
Difference 1.68  0.29  -0.08 -9.91 
Three 
Years 
 T  statistic  0.27  2.9  - -0.67 
 
* before household expansion 
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Table 5b: Descriptive statistics - a comparison of (alternative) treated and 
control groups 
 














Obs  67 97  97 97 
Mean 72.90  0.23  0.04  172.39 
3 turn 5 
Std 22.40  0.42  0.20  129.03 
Obs  1,894 2,656  2,656 2,656 
Mean 73.23  0.36  0.06  181.96 
4 turn 5 
Std  21.95 0.48  0.23 91.87 
 Means' 
Difference  -0.34 -0.13  -0.02 -9.57 
One year 
 
 T  statistic  -0.12  -2.97  -0.73 -0.72 
Obs  38 48  48 48 
Mean 69.87  0.21  0.06  187.53 
3 turn 5 
Std 16.23  0.41  0.24  160.40 
Obs 1,083  1,377  1,377  1377 
Mean 74.60  0.35  0.06  188.12 
4 turn 5 
Std  22.74 0.48  0.23 94.85 
 Means' 
Difference -4.73  -0.14  0.01  -0.59 
Two 
Years 
 T  statistic  -1.74  -2.35  0.20 -0.03 
Obs  16 18  18 18 
Mean 65.25  0.27  0  225.93 
3 turn 5 
Std 14.98  0.46  0 242.07 
Obs  350 421  421 421 
Mean 77.14  0.21  0.08  199.47 
4 turn 5 
Std 23.84  0.41  0.27 97.44 
 Means' 
Difference  -11.89 0.06  -0.08 26.47 
Three 
Years 
 T  statistic  -3.01  0.60  -5.98  0.46 
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Table 6: OLS estimates of benefits level effect on take-up rates  
 
  After One Year 
 
After Two Years  After Three Years 




































00-01     0.01 
(0.68) 
      
01-02   -0.02 
(-1.00) 
      
00-02       -0.01 
(-0.59) 
  
Arabs   -0.09 
(-2.57) 
  -0.22 
(-3.91) 
  -0.18 
(-1.97) 
Orthodox Jews    0.14 
(8.54) 
  0.19 
(6.82) 
  0.11 
(2.02) 
Virtual Price A    -0.08 
 (-2.74) 
  -0.18 
(-3.25) 
  -0.23  
(-2.12) 
Virtual Price C    0.04 
(2.31) 
 -0.01   
(-0.40) 
 -0.09   
(-1.78) 


































2,832 2,832  1,469  1,469 457  457 
t statistics are in parenthesis. 
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Table 7: Logit Estimation results  
 
  After One Year 
 
After Two Years  After Three Years 




































00-01     0.09 
(0.55) 
      
01-02   -0.11 
(0.92) 
      
00-02       -0.06 
(0.25) 
  
Arabs   -1.06 
(9.08) 
  -1.35 
(14.86) 
  -0.96 
(3.95) 
Orthodox Jews    0.83 
(67.20) 
  0.77 
(42.07) 
  0.49 
(4.04) 
Virtual Price A    -0.70 
(8.51) 




Virtual Price C    0.24 
(5.62) 
  0.60 
(6.67) 
  -0.39 
(3.17) 


































2,832 2,832  1,469  1,469 457  457 
Wald Chi-Square statistics are in parenthesis   33
Table 8: OLS Estimation results- the size of selection bias 
(The cross section population is composed of households who have 5 or 6 members. The omitted variable is five-member 
household.) 
 
  Our experiment 

















Twins  0.44  
(3.68) 
0.37 (3.15)     
Arabs   -0.18 
(-1.97) 
 - 0.06 
(-5.30) 
Orthodox Jews    0.11 
(2.02) 
  0.09 
(11.77) 
Virtual Price A    -0.23  
(-2.12) 
 - 0.22 
(-14.23) 
Virtual Price C    -0.09  
(-1.78) 
  0.22 
(26.40) 














Garden Owners    0.06 
(0.49) 
  0.11 
(9.08) 
Garden Size    -0.00 
(-0.28) 




457 457  20,541  20,541 
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 Appendix 1: Application Form 
 
“Hagihon” – Jerusalem Water Company  
 









I declare that residing in my apartment, located on __________ Street, number______ 
 
there are _____________________________ members. (Less than age 18) 
 
For children under age 18, please complete the following: 
 
Name__________________ I.D. ______________ 
 
Name__________________ I.D. ______________ 
 
Name__________________ I.D. ______________ 
 
Name__________________ I.D. ______________ 
 
Total number of persons residing in the apartment:_________________ 
 
 
Below is my signature. I confirm that all details are true, and will provide notification 
of any changes in these details. 
 




*Translated to English by the authors 
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